Paper 2009/036

Constructions of Truly Practical Secure Protocols using Standard Smartcards

Carmit Hazay and Yehuda Lindell


In this paper we show that using standard smartcards it is possible to construct truly practical secure protocols for a variety of tasks. Our protocols achieve full \emph{simulation-based security} in the presence of \emph{malicious adversaries}, and can be run on very large inputs. We present protocols for secure set intersection, oblivious database search and more. We have also implemented our set intersection protocol in order to show that it is truly practical: on sets of size 30,000 elements takes 20 seconds for one party and 30 minutes for the other. This demonstrates that in settings where physical smartcards can be sent between parties (as in the case of private data mining tasks between security and governmental agencies), it is possible to use secure protocols with proven simulation-based security.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. An extended abstract of this paper appeared in the 15th ACM CCS, 2008. This is the full version.
secure two-party computationefficient protocolssmartcards
Contact author(s)
lindell @ cs biu ac il
2009-03-08: revised
2009-01-25: received
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Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Carmit Hazay and Yehuda Lindell},
      title = {Constructions of Truly Practical Secure Protocols using Standard Smartcards},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2009/036},
      year = {2009},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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