Paper 2009/034
On a Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-512
S. Markovski, A. Mileva, V. Dimitrova, and D. Gligoroski
Abstract
A collision attack on NaSHA-512 was proposed by L. Ji et al. The claimed complexity of the attack is $2^{192}$. The proposed attack is realized by using a suitable differential pattern. In this note we show that the correct result that can be inferred from their differential pattern is in fact a conditional one. It can be stated correctly as follows: A collision attack on NaSHA-512 of complexity $k=1,2,\dots,2^{320}$ can be performed with an unknown probability of success $p_k$, where $ 0\le p_1\le p_2\le p_{2^{320}}\le 1$. Consequently, the attack proposed by L. Ji et al. can be considered only as a direction how a possible collision attack on NaSHA-512 could be realized. The birthday attack remains the best possible attack on NaSHA-512.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Cryptografic hash functionNaSHA
- Contact author(s)
- aleksandra mileva @ ugd edu mk
- History
- 2009-01-17: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2009/034
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2009/034, author = {S. Markovski and A. Mileva and V. Dimitrova and D. Gligoroski}, title = {On a Conditional Collision Attack on {NaSHA}-512}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2009/034}, year = {2009}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/034} }