Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2009/034

On a Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-512

S. Markovski, A. Mileva, V. Dimitrova and D. Gligoroski

Abstract: A collision attack on NaSHA-512 was proposed by L. Ji et al. The claimed complexity of the attack is $2^{192}$. The proposed attack is realized by using a suitable differential pattern. In this note we show that the correct result that can be inferred from their differential pattern is in fact a conditional one. It can be stated correctly as follows: A collision attack on NaSHA-512 of complexity $k=1,2,\dots,2^{320}$ can be performed with an unknown probability of success $p_k$, where $ 0\le p_1\le p_2\le p_{2^{320}}\le 1$. Consequently, the attack proposed by L. Ji et al. can be considered only as a direction how a possible collision attack on NaSHA-512 could be realized. The birthday attack remains the best possible attack on NaSHA-512.

Category / Keywords: Cryptografic hash function, NaSHA

Date: received 15 Jan 2009

Contact author: aleksandra mileva at ugd edu mk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20090117:032444 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2009/034