Paper 2008/515

Cryptanalysis of RadioGatun

Thomas Fuhr and Thomas Peyrin


In this paper we study the security of the RadioGatun family of hash functions, and more precisely the collision resistance of this proposal. We show that it is possible to find differential paths with acceptable probability of success. Then, by using the freedom degrees available from the incoming message words, we provide a significant improvement over the best previously known cryptanalysis. As a proof of concept, we provide a colliding pair of messages for RadioGatun with 2-bit words. We finally argue that, under some light assumption, our technique is very likely to provide the first collision attack on RadioGatun.

Note: corrected display errors in the differential path tables, modified the introduction

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Published elsewhere. submitted
hash functionsRadioGatuncryptanalysis
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thomas peyrin @ gmail com
2008-12-19: revised
2008-12-09: received
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      author = {Thomas Fuhr and Thomas Peyrin},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of RadioGatun},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/515},
      year = {2008},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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