Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/497
On the Correctness of An Approach Against Side-channel attacks
Peng Wang and Dengguo Feng and Wenling Wu and Liting Zhang
Abstract: Side-channel attacks are a very powerful cryptanalytic technique. Li and Gu [ProvSec'07] proposed an approach against side-channel attacks, which states that a symmetric encryption scheme is IND-secure in side-channel model, if it is IND-secure in black-box model and there is no adversary who can recover the whole key of the scheme computationally in side-channel model, i.e. WKR-SCA ^ IND -> IND-SCA. Our researches show that it is not the case. We analyze notions of security against key recovery attacks and security against distinguishing attacks, and then construct a scheme which is WKR-SCA-secure and IND-secure, but not IND-SCA-secure in the same side-channel environment. Furthermore, even if the scheme is secure again partial key recovery attacks in side-channel model, this approach still does not hold true.
Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Provable security, Side-channel attack, Symmetric encryption
Date: received 26 Nov 2008
Contact author: wp at is ac cn
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20081202:015559 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2008/497
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