Formal Proof of Relative Strengths of Security between ECK2007 Model and other Proof Models for Key Agreement Protocols

Jinyue Xia; Jiandong Wang; Liming Fang; Yongjun Ren; Shizhu Bian

Paper 2008/479

Formal Proof of Relative Strengths of Security between ECK2007 Model and other Proof Models for Key Agreement Protocols

Jinyue Xia, Jiandong Wang, Liming Fang, Yongjun Ren, and Shizhu Bian

Abstract

In 2005, Choo, Boyd & Hitchcock compared four well-known indistinguishability-based proof models for key agreement protocols, which contains the Bellare & Rogaway (1993, 1995) model, the Bellare , Pointcheval & Rogaway 2000 model and the Canetti & Krawczyk (2001) model. After that, researchers from Microsoft presented a stronger security model, called Extended Canetti-Krawczyk model (2007). In this paper, we will point out the differences between the new proof model and the four previous models, and analyze the relative strengths of security of these models. To support the implication or non-implication relation between these models, we will provide proof or counter-example.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: cryptography key agreement protocol proof model
Contact author(s): xiajinyue @ yahoo com cn
History: 2008-11-22: revised; 2008-11-18: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2008/479
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/479,
      author = {Jinyue Xia and Jiandong Wang and Liming Fang and Yongjun Ren and Shizhu Bian},
      title = {Formal Proof of Relative Strengths of Security between {ECK2007} Model and other Proof Models for Key Agreement Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/479},
      year = {2008},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/479}
}