Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/479

Formal Proof of Relative Strengths of Security between ECK2007 Model and other Proof Models for Key Agreement Protocols

Jinyue Xia, Jiandong Wang, Liming Fang, Yongjun Ren and Shizhu Bian

Abstract: In 2005, Choo, Boyd & Hitchcock compared four well-known indistinguishability-based proof models for key agreement protocols, which contains the Bellare & Rogaway (1993, 1995) model, the Bellare , Pointcheval & Rogaway 2000 model and the Canetti & Krawczyk (2001) model. After that, researchers from Microsoft presented a stronger security model, called Extended Canetti-Krawczyk model (2007). In this paper, we will point out the differences between the new proof model and the four previous models, and analyze the relative strengths of security of these models. To support the implication or non-implication relation between these models, we will provide proof or counter-example.

Category / Keywords: cryptography, key agreement protocol, proof model

Date: received 13 Nov 2008, last revised 21 Nov 2008

Contact author: xiajinyue at yahoo com cn

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Version: 20081122:061814 (All versions of this report)

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