Paper 2008/475

Sphinx: A Compact and Provably Secure Mix Format

George Danezis and Ian Goldberg

Abstract

Sphinx is a cryptographic message format used to relay anonymized messages within a mix network. It is more compact than any comparable scheme, and supports a full set of security features: indistinguishable replies, hiding the path length and relay position, as well as providing unlinkability for each leg of the message's journey over the network. We prove the full cryptographic security of Sphinx in the random oracle model, and we describe how it can be used as an efficient drop-in replacement in deployed remailer systems.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
anonymity
Contact author(s)
iang+eprint @ cs uwaterloo ca
History
2008-11-18: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/475
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/475,
      author = {George Danezis and Ian Goldberg},
      title = {Sphinx: A Compact and Provably Secure Mix Format},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/475},
      year = {2008},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/475}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/475}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.