On the Security of Fully Collusion Resistant Traitor Tracing Schemes

Yongdong WU; Robert H.  Deng

Paper 2008/450

On the Security of Fully Collusion Resistant Traitor Tracing Schemes

Yongdong WU and Robert H. Deng

Abstract

This paper investigates the security of FTT (fully collusion resistant traitor tracing) schemes in terms of DOT (Denial Of Tracing) and framing. With DOT attack, a decoder is able to detect tracing activity, and then prolongs the tracing process such that the tracer is unable to complete tracing job in a realistic time duration and hence has to abort his effort. On the other hand, by merely embedding several bytes of non-volatile memory in the decoder, we demonstrate, for the FTT schemes, how the decoder can frame innocent users at will. Furthermore, we propose a countermeasure on the framing attack.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Traitor Tracing Denial of Tracing
Contact author(s): wydong @ i2r a-star edu sg
History: 2008-10-27: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2008/450
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/450,
      author = {Yongdong WU and Robert H.  Deng},
      title = {On the Security of Fully Collusion Resistant Traitor Tracing Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/450},
      year = {2008},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/450}
}