Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/345

An Efficient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with a Tight Security Reduction

Jooyoung Lee and Choon Sik Park

Abstract: In this paper, we present a new authenticated key exchange(AKE) protocol, called NETS, and prove its security in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model under the random oracle assumption and the gap Diffie-Hellman(GDH) assumption. Our protocol enjoys a simple and tight security reduction compared to those of HMQV and CMQV without using the Forking Lemma. Each session of the NETS protocol requires only three exponentiations per party, which is comparable to the efficiency of MQV, HMQV and CMQV.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / authenticated key exchange, gap Diffie-Hellman assumption

Date: received 5 Aug 2008

Contact author: jlee05 at ensec re kr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20080811:070538 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2008/345