An Efficient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with a Tight Security Reduction

Jooyoung Lee; Choon Sik Park

Paper 2008/345

An Efficient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with a Tight Security Reduction

Jooyoung Lee and Choon Sik Park

Abstract

In this paper, we present a new authenticated key exchange(AKE) protocol, called NETS, and prove its security in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model under the random oracle assumption and the gap Diffie-Hellman(GDH) assumption. Our protocol enjoys a simple and tight security reduction compared to those of HMQV and CMQV without using the Forking Lemma. Each session of the NETS protocol requires only three exponentiations per party, which is comparable to the efficiency of MQV, HMQV and CMQV.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: authenticated key exchange gap Diffie-Hellman assumption
Contact author(s): jlee05 @ ensec re kr
History: 2008-08-11: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2008/345
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/345,
      author = {Jooyoung Lee and Choon Sik Park},
      title = {An Efficient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol with a Tight Security Reduction},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/345},
      year = {2008},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/345}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/345}
}