Authenticated Key Exchange Secure under the Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption

Jooyoung Lee; Je Hong Park

Paper 2008/344

Authenticated Key Exchange Secure under the Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption

Jooyoung Lee and Je Hong Park

Abstract

In this paper, we present a new authenticated key exchange(AKE) protocol and prove its security under the random oracle assumption and the computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) assumption. In the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model, there has been no known AKE protocol based on the CDH assumption. Our protocol, called NAXOS+, is obtained by slightly modifying the NAXOS protocol proposed by LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin. We establish a formal security proof of NAXOS+ in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model using as a main tool the trapdoor test presented by Cash, Kiltz and Shoup.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: authenticated key exchange trapdoor test
Contact author(s): jlee05 @ ensec re kr
History: 2008-08-11: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2008/344
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/344,
      author = {Jooyoung Lee and Je Hong Park},
      title = {Authenticated Key Exchange Secure under the Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/344},
      year = {2008},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/344}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/344}
}