Paper 2008/283
Attacks on Singelee and Preneel's protocol
Jorge Munilla and Alberto Peinado
Abstract
Singelee and Preneel have recently proposed a enhancement of Hancke and Kuhn's distance bounding protocol for RFID. The authors claim that their protocol offers substantial reductions in the number of rounds, though preserving its advantages: suitable to be employed in noisy wireless environments, and requiring so few resources to run that it can be implemented on a low-cost device. Subsequently, the same authors have also proposed it as an efficient key establishment protocol in wireless personal area networks. Nevertheless, in this paper we show effective relay attacks on this protocol, which dramatically increase the success probability of an adversary. As a result, the effectiveness of Singelee and Preneel's protocol is seriously questioned.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- RFIDrelay attackdistance bounding protocols
- Contact author(s)
- munilla @ ic uma es
- History
- 2008-06-25: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2008/283
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/283,
author = {Jorge Munilla and Alberto Peinado},
title = {Attacks on Singelee and Preneel's protocol},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/283},
year = {2008},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/283}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/283}
}
