Paper 2008/243

On the economic payoff of forensic systems when used to trace Counterfeited Software and content

Yacov Yacobi

Abstract

We analyze how well forensic systems reduce counterfeiting of soft- ware and content. We make a few idealized assumptions, and show that if the revenues of the producer before the introduction of forensics (Ro) are non-zero then the payoff of forensics is independent of the overall market size, it declines as the ratio between the penalty and the crime (both monetized) goes up, but that this behavior is reversed if Ro = 0. We also show that the payoff goes up as the ratio between success probability with and without forensics grows; however, for typical parameters most of the payoff is already reached when this ratio is 5.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Counterfeitingpiracyforensicseconomics
Contact author(s)
yacov @ microsoft com
History
2008-06-03: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/243
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/243,
      author = {Yacov Yacobi},
      title = {On the economic  payoff of forensic  systems when used to trace Counterfeited Software and content},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/243},
      year = {2008},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/243}
}
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