Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/104

Simplified Security Notions of Direct Anonymous Attestation and a Concrete Scheme from Pairings

Ernie Brickell, Liqun Chen and Jiangtao Li

Abstract: Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a cryptographic mechanism that enables remote authentication of a user while preserving privacy under the user's control. The DAA scheme developed by Brickell, Camenisch, and Chen has been adopted by the Trust Computing Group (TCG) for remote anonymous attestation of Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a small hardware device with limited storage space and communication capability. In this paper, we provide two contributions to DAA. We first introduce simplified security notions of DAA including the formal definitions of user controlled anonymity and traceability. We then propose a new DAA scheme from elliptic curve cryptography and bilinear maps. The lengths of private keys and signatures in our scheme are much shorter than the lengths in the original DAA scheme, with a similar level of security and computational complexity. Our scheme builds upon the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature scheme and is efficient and provably secure in the random oracle model under the LRSW (stands for Lysyanskaya, Rivest, Sahai and Wolf) assumption and the decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / direct anonymous attestation, trusted computing, user-controlled-anonymity, user-controlled-traceability, bilinear maps.

Date: received 10 Mar 2008

Contact author: liqun chen at hp com

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20080312:123153 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]