Paper 2008/097
Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority
Shien Jin Ong, David Parkes, Alon Rosen, and Salil Vadhan
Abstract
We provide a simple protocol for secret reconstruction in any threshold secret sharing scheme, and prove that it is fair when executed with many rational parties together with a small minority of honest parties. That is, all parties will learn the secret with high probability when the honest parties follow the protocol and the rational parties act in their own self-interest (as captured by the notion of a Bayesian subgame perfect equilibrium). The protocol only requires a standard (synchronous) broadcast channel, and tolerates fail-stop deviations (i.e. early stopping, but not incorrectly computed messages). Previous protocols for this problem in the cryptographic or economic models have either required an honest majority, used strong communication channels that enable simultaneous exchange of information, or settled for approximate notions of security/equilibria.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- game theoryfairnesssecret sharing
- Contact author(s)
- alon rosen @ idc ac il
- History
- 2008-03-10: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2008/097
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/097,
author = {Shien Jin Ong and David Parkes and Alon Rosen and Salil Vadhan},
title = {Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/097},
year = {2008},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/097}
}
