Paper 2008/080

Pairing-Based Onion Routing with Improved Forward Secrecy

Aniket Kate, Greg Zaverucha, and Ian Goldberg


This paper presents new protocols for onion routing anonymity networks. We define a provably secure privacy-preserving key agreement scheme in an identity-based infrastructure setting, and use it to forge new onion routing circuit constructions. These constructions, based on a user's selection, offer immediate or eventual forward secrecy at each node in a circuit and require significantly less computation and communication than the telescoping mechanism used by Tor. Further, the use of the identity-based infrastructure also leads to a reduction in the required amount of authenticated directory information. Therefore, our constructions provide practical ways to allow onion routing anonymity networks to scale gracefully.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Extended version of a paper published in PETS 2007
Onion routingTorpairing-based cryptographyanonymous key agreementforward secrecy
Contact author(s)
iang @ cs uwaterloo ca
2008-02-27: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Aniket Kate and Greg Zaverucha and Ian Goldberg},
      title = {Pairing-Based Onion Routing with Improved Forward Secrecy},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2008/080},
      year = {2008},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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