Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/059

Buying random votes is as hard as buying no-votes

Stefan Popoveniuc and Jonathan Stanton

Abstract: In voting systems where a mark in a fixed position may mean a vote for Alice on a ballot,and a vote for Bob on another ballot, an attacker may coerce voters to put their mark at a certain position, enforcing effectively a random vote. This attack is meaningful if the voting system allows to take receipts with them and/or posts them to a bulletin board. The coercer may also ask for a blank receipt. We analyze this kind of attack and prove that it requires the same effort as a comparable attack would require against any voting system, even one without receipts.

Category / Keywords: applications / voting, randomizartion attack

Publication Info: the paper has not been published anywhere

Date: received 3 Feb 2008

Contact author: poste at gwu edu

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Version: 20080203:205700 (All versions of this report)

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