Paper 2008/059

Stefan Popoveniuc and Jonathan Stanton

Abstract

In voting systems where a mark in a fixed position may mean a vote for Alice on a ballot,and a vote for Bob on another ballot, an attacker may coerce voters to put their mark at a certain position, enforcing effectively a random vote. This attack is meaningful if the voting system allows to take receipts with them and/or posts them to a bulletin board. The coercer may also ask for a blank receipt. We analyze this kind of attack and prove that it requires the same effort as a comparable attack would require against any voting system, even one without receipts.

Available format(s)
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. the paper has not been published anywhere
Keywords
votingrandomizartion attack
Contact author(s)
poste @ gwu edu
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2008/059

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/059,
author = {Stefan Popoveniuc and Jonathan Stanton},