Paper 2008/049
An Efficient Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries
Yehuda Lindell and Benny Pinkas
Abstract
We show an efficient secure two-party protocol, based on Yao's construction, which provides security against malicious adversaries. Yao's original protocol is only secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, and can be transformed into a protocol that achieves security against malicious adversaries by applying the compiler of Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson (the ``GMW compiler''). However, this approach does not seem to be very practical as it requires using generic zero-knowledge proofs.
Our construction is based on applying cut-and-choose techniques to the original circuit and inputs. Security is proved according to the {\sf ideal/real simulation paradigm}, and the proof is in the standard model (with no random oracle model or common reference string assumptions). The resulting protocol is computationally efficient: the only usage of asymmetric cryptography is for running
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. An extended abstract appeared in Eurocrypt 2007. This is the full version
- Keywords
- secure two-party computationefficiency
- Contact author(s)
- lindell @ cs biu ac il
- History
- 2008-01-30: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2008/049
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/049, author = {Yehuda Lindell and Benny Pinkas}, title = {An Efficient Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/049}, year = {2008}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/049} }