Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2008/007

Efficient One-round Key Exchange in the Standard Model

Colin Boyd and Yvonne Cliff and Juan M. Gonzalez Nieto and Kenneth G. Paterson

Abstract: We consider one-round identity-based key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the random oracle model.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / key establishment, key encapsulation, id-based cryptography, standard model

Publication Info: This is the full version of the paper appearing at ACISP 2008

Date: received 3 Jan 2008, last revised 7 May 2008

Contact author: j gonzaleznieto at qut edu au

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: - Fixed definition of session id in Protocol 2 and added some informal discussion on why malleability attacks do not work against protocol 2 in Section 4. - Modified the second part of the proof of Protocol 2 to take into consideration the security of the randomness extractor and expander. - Numerous typos have been corrected.

Version: 20080507:122121 (All versions of this report)

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