Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2007/415

Cryptanalytic Flaws in Oh et al.'s ID-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol

Meng-Hui Lim and Sanggon Lee and Hoonjae Lee

Abstract: A key agreement protocol is designed for two or more entities to agree upon a shared secret key, which is used to preserve confidentiality and data integrity over an open network. In 2007, Oh et al. proposed an efficient ID-based authenticated key agreement protocol on elliptic curve pairings, which is believed to be able to generate two session keys securely after a protocol execution. However, we discover that their protocol is in fact susceptible to the basic impersonation attack as well as the key compromise impersonation attack. In this paper, we present the imperfections of Oh et al.'s scheme and subsequently we suggest a slight modification to the scheme which would resolve the problems.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Cryptanalysis, Impersonation Attack, Key Agreement Protocol

Date: received 30 Oct 2007

Contact author: meng17121983 at yahoo com

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Version: 20071106:084534 (All versions of this report)

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