Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2007/411

Cryptanalysis on Improved One-round Lin-Li's Tripartite Key Agreement Protocol

Meng-Hui Lim and Sanggon Lee and Hoonjae Lee

Abstract: A tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol is designed for three entities to communicate securely over an open network particularly with a shared key. Recently, we have improved a one-round tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol proposed by Lin-Li due to its vulnerability to the forging attack in our previous report. However, we have later discovered that both the original Lin-Li's scheme and our previous enhanced protocol are vulnerable to the insider replay attack. Moreover, we have also realized that both protocols have falsely claimed the forward secrecy attribute. In this paper, we will revise our improvements and again secure this protocol against these cryptanalytic attacks while recovering the precious perfect forward secrecy property.

Category / Keywords: Cryptanalysis, Tripartite, Key Agreement Protocol

Date: received 25 Oct 2007, last revised 10 Dec 2007

Contact author: meng17121983 at yahoo com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20071211:045954 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2007/411