### On the security defects of an image encryption scheme

Chengqing Li, Shujun Li, Muhammad Asim, Juana Nunez, Gonzalo Alvarez, and Guanrong Chen

##### Abstract

This paper studies the security of a recently-proposed chaos-based image encryption scheme, and points out the following problems: 1) there exist a number of invalid keys and weak keys, and some keys are partially equivalent for encryption/decryption; 2) given one chosen plain-image, a subkey $K_{10}$ can be guessed with a smaller computational complexity than that of the simple brute-force attack; 3) given at most 128 chosen plain-images, a chosen-plaintext attack can possibly break the following part of the secret key: $\{K_i\bmod 128\}_{i=4}^{10}$, which works very well when $K_{10}$ is not too large; 4) when $K_{10}$ is relatively small, a known-plaintext attack can be carried out with only one known plain-image to recover some visual information of any other plain-images encrypted by the same key.

Available format(s)
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
cryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
swiftsheep @ hotmail com
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2007/397

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/397,
author = {Chengqing Li and Shujun Li and Muhammad Asim and Juana Nunez and Gonzalo Alvarez and Guanrong Chen},
title = {On the security defects of an image encryption scheme},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2007/397},
year = {2007},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/397}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/397}
}

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