Paper 2007/364
A Proof of Security of a Mesh Security Architecture
Doug Kuhlman, Ryan Moriarty, Tony Braskich, Steve Emeott, and Mahesh Tripunitara
Abstract
The IEEE 802.11s standard is tasked to provide ways of establishing and securing a wireless mesh network. One proposal establishes a Mesh Security Architecture (MSA), with an interesting key hierarchy and full protocol definitions. This paper proves the correctness and security of the MSA proposal and its corresponding protocols. We also propose and prove the security of an additional protocol (an abbreviated handshake) which offers a substantial efficiency improvement in certain instances. To prove the entire architecture secure, we utilize Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) to prove each protocol secure. From that basis, we can show the protocols compose securely to prove the entire architecture. We also contribute some novel concepts to PCL, to allow us to prove the security of the overall architecture.
Note: Expediting publication would be valuable for standards work.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- IEEE 802.11sprotocol provingmesh security architectureprotocol composition logic (PCL)
- Contact author(s)
- doug kuhlman @ motorola com
- History
- 2007-09-13: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2007/364
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/364,
author = {Doug Kuhlman and Ryan Moriarty and Tony Braskich and Steve Emeott and Mahesh Tripunitara},
title = {A Proof of Security of a Mesh Security Architecture},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/364},
year = {2007},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/364}
}
