Zero-Knowledge in the Applied Pi-calculus and Automated Verification of the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol

Michael Backes; Matteo Maffei; Dominique Unruh

Paper 2007/289

Zero-Knowledge in the Applied Pi-calculus and Automated Verification of the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol

Michael Backes, Matteo Maffei, and Dominique Unruh

Abstract

We devise an abstraction of zero-knowledge protocols that is accessible to a fully mechanized analysis. The abstraction is formalized within the applied pi-calculus using a novel equational theory that abstractly characterizes the cryptographic semantics of zero-knowledge proofs. We present an encoding from the equational theory into a convergent rewriting system that is suitable for the automated protocol verifier ProVerif. The encoding is sound and fully automated. We successfully used ProVerif to obtain the first mechanized analysis of the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol. The analysis in particular required us to devise novel abstractions of sophisticated cryptographic security definitions based on interactive games.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Foundations
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: zero-knowledge abstraction mechanized analysis direct anonymous attestation DAA
Contact author(s): backes @ cs uni-sb de
History: 2007-08-07: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2007/289
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2007/289,
      author = {Michael Backes and Matteo Maffei and Dominique Unruh},
      title = {Zero-Knowledge in the Applied Pi-calculus and Automated Verification of the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2007/289},
      year = {2007},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2007/289}
}