Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2007/198

Mutual Information Analysis -- A Universal Differential Side-Channel Attack

Benedikt Gierlichs and Lejla Batina and Pim Tuyls

Abstract: In this paper, we develop an information theoretic differential side-channel attack. An embedded device containing a secret key is modeled as a black box with a leakage function whose output is captured by an adversary through the noisy measurement of a physical observable e.g. the power consumed by the device. We assume only that the measured values depend somehow on the leakage and thus on the word being processed by the device. Without any knowledge on the particular dependency, this fact is exploited to mount a side-channel attack. We build a distinguisher which uses the Mutual Information between the observed and the leaked values as a statistical test. The Mutual Information is maximal when the hypothetical key guessed by the attacker equals the key in the device. Our approach is confirmed by experimental results. We perform power analysis on an embedded device using our Mutual Information based distinguisher and show that the correct key is clearly distinguishable. Finally, our approach allows to compute a good estimate of the minimal number of traces required to perform a successful attack and gives an upper bound on the information leakage in a single observation.

Category / Keywords: applications / Differential Side Channel Analysis, Information Theory, Mutual Information

Date: received 27 May 2007, last revised 20 Jun 2007

Contact author: benedikt gierlichs at esat kuleuven be

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Version: 20070620:164913 (All versions of this report)

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