Paper 2007/123

Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS

Berkant Ustaoglu


LaMacchia, Lauter and Mityagin recently presented a strong security definition for authenticated key agreement strengthening the well-known Canetti-Krawczyk definition. They also described a protocol, called NAXOS, that enjoys a simple security proof in the new model. Compared to MQV and HMQV, NAXOS is less efficient and cannot be readily modified to obtain a one-pass protocol. On the other hand MQV does not have a security proof, and the HMQV security proof is extremely complicated. This paper proposes a new authenticated key agreement protocol, called CMQV (`Combined' MQV), which incorporates design principles from MQV, HMQV and NAXOS. The new protocol achieves the efficiency of HMQV and admits a natural one-pass variant. Moreover, we present a simple and intuitive proof that CMQV is secure in the LaMacchia-Lauter-Mityagin model.

Note: Updated (extended) and corrected version; see "Errata" and "Revisions" in the appendix for a summary of changes.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Journal of "Designs Codes and Cryptography", 2008, v46(3).
key agreement protocolsprovable securityMQVDiffie-Hellman
Contact author(s)
bustaoglu @ cryptolounge net
2009-06-22: last of 2 revisions
2007-04-03: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Berkant Ustaoglu},
      title = {Obtaining a secure and efficient key agreement protocol from (H)MQV and NAXOS},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2007/123},
      year = {2007},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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