Paper 2007/081

Revisiting an Efficient Elliptic Curve Key Agreement Protocol

Maurizio Adriano Strangio


A recent paper by Wang \emph{et al.} has revealed a vulnerability in the ECKE-1 key agreement protocol. In particular, contrary to the author's claims, protocol ECKE-1 is shown to be susceptible to a key-compromise impersonation attack. This attack was also independently pointed out by the author in another recent paper published in the EURASIP Journal on Embedded Systems. Here we present a revised version of the protocol, ECKE-1R, that is key-compromise impersonation resilient at the expense of a higher computational workload and communication complexity with respect to the original protocol ECKE-1.

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Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. elliptic curve cryptosystem
Contact author(s)
strangio @ mat uniroma3 it
2007-04-23: last of 3 revisions
2007-03-01: received
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      author = {Maurizio Adriano Strangio},
      title = {Revisiting an Efficient Elliptic Curve Key Agreement Protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2007/081},
      year = {2007},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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