Cryptanalysis of An Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation Protocol Based On Polynomial Reconstruction Problem

Huang Lin and Zhenfu Cao

Abstract

In 1999, Naor and Pinkas \cite {NP99} presented a useful protocol called oblivious polynomial evaluation(OPE). In this paper, the cryptanalysis of the OPE protocol is presented. It's shown that the receiver can successfully get the sender's secret polynomial $P$ after executing the OPE protocol only once, which means the privacy of the sender can be violated and the security of the OPE protocol will be broken. It's also proven that the complexity of the cryptanalysis is the same with the corresponding protocols cryptanalyzed.

Note: There is an error in this paper.

Available format(s)
-- withdrawn --
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
oblivious polynomial evaluationpolynomial reconstruction problemcryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
faustlin @ sjtu edu cn
History
2007-01-11: withdrawn