Paper 2006/391
A Note on Bounded Chosen Ciphertext Security from Black-box Semantical Security
Ronald Cramer, Dennis Hofheinz, and Eike Kiltz
Abstract
Designing public key encryption schemes withstanding chosen
ciphertext attacks, which is the highest security level for such
schemes, is generally perceived as a delicate and intricate task,
and for good reason. In the standard model, there are essentially
three well-known but quite involved approaches.
This state of affairs is to be contrasted with the situation for
semantically secure encryption schemes, a much weaker security
notion that only guarantees security in the absence of active
attack but that appears to be much easier to fulfill,
both conceptually and practically. Thus, the boundary
between passive attack and active attack seems to make up the
dividing line between which security levels are relatively easily
achieved and which are not. Our contributions are two-fold.
First, we show a simple, efficient black-box construction of a
public key encryption scheme withstanding chosen ciphertext attack
from any given semantically secure one. Our scheme is
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Black-box constructionchosen-ciphertext security
- Contact author(s)
- kiltz @ cwi nl
- History
- 2006-11-12: revised
- 2006-11-12: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/391
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/391, author = {Ronald Cramer and Dennis Hofheinz and Eike Kiltz}, title = {A Note on Bounded Chosen Ciphertext Security from Black-box Semantical Security}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/391}, year = {2006}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/391} }