Paper 2006/367

An Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme

Xuefei Cao, Kenneth G. Paterson, and Weidong Kou

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that a certificateless signature scheme recently proposed by Gorantla and Saxena is insecure. It is shown that an adversary who replaces the public key of a signer can then forge valid signatures for that signer without knowledge of the signer's private key.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
kenny paterson @ rhul ac uk
History
2006-11-03: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/367
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/367,
      author = {Xuefei Cao and Kenneth G.  Paterson and Weidong Kou},
      title = {An Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2006/367},
      year = {2006},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/367}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/367}
}
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