Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/350

Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of ARIA and Camellia

Wenling Wu, Wentao Zhang, and Dengguo Feng

Abstract: This paper studies the security of the block ciphers ARIA and Camellia against impossible differential cryptanalysis. Our work improves the best impossible differential cryptanalysis of ARIA and Camellia known so far. The designers of ARIA expected no impossible differentials exist for 4-round ARIA. However, we found some nontrivial 4-round impossible differentials, which may lead to a possible attack on 6-round ARIA. Moreover, we found some nontrivial 8-round impossible differentials for Camellia, whereas only 7-round impossible differentials were previously known. By using the 8-round impossible differentials, we presented an attack on 12-round Camellia without $FL/FL^{-1}$ layers.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography /

Date: received 18 Oct 2006

Contact author: wwl at is iscas ac cn

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20061020:101731 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2006/350