Paper 2006/326
Analyzing the HB and HB+ Protocols in the ``Large Error'' Case
Jonathan Katz and Adam Smith
Abstract
HB and HB+ are two shared-key, unidirectional authentication protocols whose extremely low computational cost makes them potentially well-suited for severely resource-constrained devices. Security of these protocols is based on the conjectured hardness of learning parity with noise; that is, learning a secret $s$ given ``noisy'' dot products of $s$ that are incorrect with probability $\epsilon$. Although the problem of learning parity with noise is meaningful for any constant $\epsilon < 1/2$, existing proofs of security for HB and HB+ only imply security when $\epsilon < 1/4$. In this note, we show how to extend these proofs to the case of arbitrary $\epsilon < 1/2$.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- RFID
- Contact author(s)
- jkatz @ cs umd edu
- History
- 2006-09-28: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/326
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/326,
author = {Jonathan Katz and Adam Smith},
title = {Analyzing the HB and HB+ Protocols in the ``Large Error'' Case},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2006/326},
year = {2006},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/326}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/326}
}
