Paper 2006/317
Weaknesses of the FORK-256 compression function
Krystian Matusiewicz, Scott Contini, and Josef Pieprzyk
Abstract
This report presents analysis of the compression function of a recently proposed hash function, FORK-256. We exhibit some unexpected differentials existing for the step transformation and show their possible uses in collision-finding attacks on different variants of FORK-256. As a simple application of those observations we present a method of finding chosen IV collisions for a variant of FORK-256 reduced to two branches : either 1 and 2 or 3 and 4. Moreover, we present how those differentials can be used in the full FORK-256 to easily find messages with hashes differing by only a relatively small number of bits. We argue that this method allows for finding collisions in the full function with complexity not exceeding $2^{126.6}$ hash evaluations, better than birthday attack and additionally requiring only a small amount of memory.
Note: Included new results on the full function.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- hash functionscryptanalysisFORK-256
- Contact author(s)
- kmatus @ ics mq edu au
- History
- 2006-11-29: last of 3 revisions
- 2006-09-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/317
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/317,
author = {Krystian Matusiewicz and Scott Contini and Josef Pieprzyk},
title = {Weaknesses of the {FORK}-256 compression function},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/317},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/317}
}
