Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/138

Trace-Driven Cache Attacks on AES

Onur Acıiçmez and Çetin Kaya Koç

Abstract: Cache based side-channel attacks have recently been attracted significant attention due to the new developments in the field. In this paper, we present efficient trace-driven cache attacks on a widely used implementation of the AES cryptosystem. We also evaluate the cost of the proposed attacks in detail under the assumption of a noiseless environment. We develop an accurate mathematical model that we use in the cost analysis of our attacks. We use two different metrics, specifically, the expected number of necessary traces and the cost of the analysis phase, for the cost evaluation purposes. Each of these metrics represents the cost of a different phase of the attack.

Category / Keywords: cache attack, trace driven, side-channel cryptanalysis, AES

Publication Info: A short version was presented at ICICS'06

Date: received 8 Apr 2006, last revised 5 Dec 2006

Contact author: aciicmez at eecs oregonstate edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: We have improved the previously presented attack and also developed a new attack variant, which is much more efficient than the previous attack.

Version: 20061205:190302 (All versions of this report)

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