Paper 2006/138

Trace-Driven Cache Attacks on AES

Onur Ac\i{}içmez and Çetin Kaya Koç


Cache based side-channel attacks have recently been attracted significant attention due to the new developments in the field. In this paper, we present efficient trace-driven cache attacks on a widely used implementation of the AES cryptosystem. We also evaluate the cost of the proposed attacks in detail under the assumption of a noiseless environment. We develop an accurate mathematical model that we use in the cost analysis of our attacks. We use two different metrics, specifically, the expected number of necessary traces and the cost of the analysis phase, for the cost evaluation purposes. Each of these metrics represents the cost of a different phase of the attack.

Note: We have improved the previously presented attack and also developed a new attack variant, which is much more efficient than the previous attack.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Published elsewhere. A short version was presented at ICICS'06
cache attacktrace drivenside-channel cryptanalysisAES
Contact author(s)
aciicmez @ eecs oregonstate edu
2006-12-05: last of 3 revisions
2006-04-09: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Onur Ac\i{}içmez and Çetin Kaya Koç},
      title = {Trace-Driven Cache Attacks on AES},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2006/138},
      year = {2006},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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