Cryptanalysis of RSA with constrained keys

Abderrahmane Nitaj

Abstract

Let $n=pq$ be an RSA modulus with unknown prime factors and $F$ any function for which there exists an integer $u\neq 0$ satisfying $F(u)\approx n$ and $pu$ or $qu$ is computable from $F(u)$ and $n$. We show that choosing a public key exponent $e$ for which there exist positive integers $X$, $Y$ such that $\left\vert eY-XF(u)\right\vert$ and $Y$ are suitably small, then the system is insecure.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
RSA cryptosystemCryptanalysisContinued fractionsBlömer-May attackCoppersmith's algorithm
Contact author(s)
nitaj @ math unicaen fr
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/092

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/092,
author = {Abderrahmane Nitaj},
title = {Cryptanalysis of RSA with constrained keys},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2006/092},
year = {2006},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/092}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/092}
}

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