Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/069

Automated Security Proofs with Sequences of Games

Bruno Blanchet and David Pointcheval

Abstract: This paper presents the first automatic technique for proving not only protocols but also primitives in the exact security computational model. Automatic proofs of cryptographic protocols were up to now reserved to the Dolev-Yao model, which however makes quite strong assumptions on the primitives. On the other hand, with the proofs by reductions, in the complexity theoretic framework, more subtle security assumptions can be considered, but security analyses are manual. A process calculus is thus defined in order to take into account the probabilistic semantics of the computational model. It is already rich enough to describe all the usual security notions of both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, as well as the basic computational assumptions. As an example, we illustrate the use of the new tool with the proof of a quite famous asymmetric primitive: unforgeability under chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA) of the Full-Domain Hash signature scheme under the (trapdoor)-one-wayness of some permutations.

Category / Keywords: security proof; automatic proofs; sequences of games; computationally sound

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-CRYPTO-2006
DOI:
10.1007/11818175_32

Date: received 23 Feb 2006, last revised 3 Dec 2020

Contact author: bruno blanchet at inria fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Fixes an error in Definition 1.

Version: 20201203:151203 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2006/069


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