Paper 2006/047
Cryptographically Sound Theorem Proving
Christoph Sprenger, Michael Backes, David Basin, Birgit Pfitzmann, and Michael Waidner
Abstract
We describe a faithful embedding of the Dolev-Yao model of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner (CCS 2003) in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. This model is cryptographically sound in the strong sense of reactive simulatability/UC, which essentially entails the preservation of arbitrary security properties under active attacks and in arbitrary protocol environments. The main challenge in designing a practical formalization of this model is to cope with the complexity of providing such strong soundness guarantees. We reduce this complexity by abstracting the model into a sound, light-weight formalization that enables both concise property specifications and efficient application of our proof strategies and their supporting proof tools. This yields the first tool-supported framework for symbolically verifying security protocols that enjoys the strong cryptographic soundness guarantees provided by reactive simulatability/UC. As a proof of concept, we have proved the security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol using our framework.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- formal methodscryptographic soundnessDolev-YaosimulatabilityUCtheorem proving
- Contact author(s)
- sprenger @ inf ethz ch
- History
- 2006-02-10: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/047
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/047,
author = {Christoph Sprenger and Michael Backes and David Basin and Birgit Pfitzmann and Michael Waidner},
title = {Cryptographically Sound Theorem Proving},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/047},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/047}
}
