Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/458

Seifert's RSA Fault Attack: Simplified Analysis and Generalizations

James A. Muir

Abstract: Seifert recently described a new fault attack against an implementation of RSA signature verification. Here we give a simplified analysis of Seifert's attack and gauge its practicality against RSA moduli of practical sizes. We suggest an improvement to Seifert's attack which has the following consequences: if an adversary is able to cause random faults in only 4 bits of a 1024-bit RSA modulus stored in a device, then there is a greater than 50% chance that they will be able to make that device accept a signature on a message of their choice. For 2048-bit RSA, 6 bits suffice.

Category / Keywords: implementation / RSA, fault analysis

Date: received 15 Dec 2005

Contact author: jamuir at scs carleton ca

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20051231:145408 (All versions of this report)

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