Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/401

A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols

Bruno Blanchet

Abstract: We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of cryptographic protocols. In contrast to most previous provers, our tool does not rely on the Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It produces proofs presented as sequences of games; these games are formalized in a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus. Our tool provides a generic method for specifying security properties of the cryptographic primitives, which can handle shared- and public-key encryption, signatures, message authentication codes, and hash functions. Our tool produces proofs valid for a number of sessions polynomial in the security parameter, in the presence of an active adversary. We have implemented our tool and tested it on a number of examples of protocols from the literature.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols /

Publication Info: A short version of this paper appears at IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, 2006. This is the full version.

Date: received 7 Nov 2005, last revised 16 Jun 2012

Contact author: blanchet at di ens fr

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: The revision includes extensions to handle more cryptographic primitives, improvements in the simplification of games, and a few minor updates and bug fixes.

Version: 20120616:095147 (All versions of this report)

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