Paper 2005/357

Cryptanalysis of Two ID-based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings

Kyung-Ah Shim

Abstract

Recently, a number of ID-based two-party authenticated key agreement protocols which make of bilinear pairings have been proposed \cite {CJL,MB,Sh,S,X}. In this paper, we show that the Xie's protocol \cite {X} does not provide implicit key authentication and key-compromise impersonation resilience. Also, we point out the vulnerability of the Choi {\it et al}'s protocol \cite {CJL} against signature forgery attacks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
cryptanalysiskey management
Contact author(s)
kashim @ ewha ac kr
History
2005-10-09: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2005/357
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/357,
      author = {Kyung-Ah Shim},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of Two {ID}-based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols from Pairings},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/357},
      year = {2005},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/357}
}
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