Paper 2005/240

Attack on Okamoto et al.'s New Short Signature Schemes

Fangguo Zhang and Xiaofeng Chen

Abstract

We present an attack on a new short signature scheme from bilinear pairing proposed by Okamoto $et$ $al.$ at ITCC'05. We show that any one can derive the secret key of the signer from any two message-signature pairs and so can forge the signer's signature for any message. This means the scheme is totally broken.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Publication info
Published elsewhere. 2005 China National Computer Conference
Keywords
Short SignatureBilinear PairingAttack
Contact author(s)
isdzhfg @ zsu edu cn
History
2005-07-30: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2005/240
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/240,
      author = {Fangguo Zhang and Xiaofeng Chen},
      title = {Attack on Okamoto  et al.'s New Short Signature Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/240},
      year = {2005},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/240}
}
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