Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/179

Intrusion-Resilience via the Bounded-Storage Model

Stefan Dziembowski

Abstract: We introduce a new method of achieving intrusion-resilience in the cryptographic protocols. More precisely we show how to preserve security of such protocols, even if a malicious program (e.g. a virus) was installed on a computer of an honest user (and it was later removed). The security of our protocols relies on the assumption that the amount of data that the adversary can transfer from the infected machine is limited (however, we allow the adversary to perform any efficient computation on user's private data, before deciding on what to transfer). We focus on two cryptographic tasks, namely: authenticated key exchange and entity authentication. Our method is based on the results from the Bounded-Storage Model.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / key management, bounded-storage model

Date: received 14 Jun 2005, last revised 7 Jun 2006

Contact author: std at mimuw edu pl

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Version: 20060608:000359 (All versions of this report)

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