Paper 2005/147

Tamper-Evident Digital Signatures: Protecting Certification Authorities Against Malware

Jong Youl Choi, Philippe Golle, and Markus Jakobsson


We introduce the notion of tamper-evidence for digital signature generation in order to defend against attacks aimed at covertly leaking secret information held by corrupted network nodes. This is achieved by letting observers (which need not be trusted) verify the absence of covert channels by means of techniques we introduce herein. We call our signature schemes tamper-evident since any deviation from the protocol is immediately detectable. We demonstrate our technique for RSA-PSS and DSA signature schemes and how the same technique can be applied to Feige-Fiat-Shamir (FFS) and Schnorr signature schemes. Our technique does not modify the distribution of the generated signature transcripts, and has only a minimal overhead in terms of computation, communication, and storage. Keywords. covert channel, malware, observer, subliminal channel, tamper-evident, undercover

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
covert channelmalwareobserversubliminal channeltamper-evidentundercover
Contact author(s)
jychoi @ cs indiana edu
2005-05-23: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Jong Youl Choi and Philippe Golle and Markus Jakobsson},
      title = {Tamper-Evident Digital Signatures: Protecting Certification Authorities Against Malware},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2005/147},
      year = {2005},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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