A Uniform Framework for Cryptanalysis of the Bluetooth $E_0$ Cipher

Ophir Levy; Avishai Wool

Paper 2005/107

A Uniform Framework for Cryptanalysis of the Bluetooth $E_0$ Cipher

Ophir Levy and Avishai Wool

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the $E_0$ cipher, which is the encryption system used in the Bluetooth specification. We suggest a uniform framework for cryptanalysis of the $E_0$ cipher. Our method requires 128 known bits of the keystream in order to recover the initial state of the LFSRs, which reflects the secret key of this encryption engine. In one setting, our framework reduces to an attack of D. Bleichenbacher. In another setting, our framework is equivalent to an attack presented by Fluhrer and Lucks. Our best attack can recover the initial state of the LFSRs after solving $2^{86}$ boolean linear systems of equations, which is roughly equivalent to the results obtained by Fluhrer and Lucks.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s): yash @ eng tau ac il
History: 2005-04-14: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2005/107
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/107,
      author = {Ophir Levy and Avishai Wool},
      title = {A Uniform Framework for Cryptanalysis of the Bluetooth $E_0$ Cipher},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2005/107},
      year = {2005},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/107}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/107}
}