Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/081

Smashing SMASH

Norbert Pramstaller and Christian Rechberger and Vincent Rijmen

Abstract: We present a collision attack on the recently proposed hash function SMASH. The attack uses negligible resources and we conjecture that it works for all hash functions built following the design method of SMASH.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / hash functions

Publication Info: paper accepted at SAC 2005

Date: received 16 Mar 2005, last revised 17 Mar 2005, withdrawn 4 Jul 2005

Contact author: vincent rijmen at iaik tugraz at

Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)

Note: Paper withdrawn because it is accepted at SAC 2005.

Version: 20050704:145016 (All versions of this report)

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