Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/080

A QKD Protocol Extendable to Support Entanglement and Reduce Unauthorized Information Gain by Randomizing the Bases Lists with Key Values and Invalidate Explicit Privacy Amplification

R. Venkatesh and C. Sanjeevakumar and M. Kasi Rajan and L. Sudarsan and N. Srinivasan

Abstract: This paper suggests an improvement to the BB84 scheme in Quantum key distribution. The original scheme has its weakness in letting quantifiably more information gain to an eavesdropper during public announcement of unencrypted bases lists. The security of the secret key comes at the expense of the final key length. We aim at exploiting the randomness of preparation (measurement) basis and the bit values encoded (observed), so as to randomize the bases lists before they are communicated over the public channel. A proof of security is given for our scheme and proven that our protocol results in lesser information gain by Eve in comparison with BB84 and its other extensions. Moreover, an analysis is made on the feasibility of our proposal as such and to support entanglement based QKD. The performance of our protocol is compared in terms of the upper and lower bounds on the tolerable bit error rate. We also quantify the information gain (by Eve) mathematically using the familiar approach of the concept of Shannon entropy. The paper models the attack by Eve in terms of interference in a multi-access quantum channel. Besides, this paper also hints at the invalidation of a separate privacy amplification step in the "prepare-and-measure" protocols in general.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Quantum Key Distribution

Publication Info: published in arXiv archive, Cornell University ref no:quant-ph/0503024

Date: received 11 Mar 2005

Contact author: sanmit_1983 at yahoo com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: 13 pages and 1 figure

Version: 20050317:144356 (All versions of this report)

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