On Session Identifiers in Provably Secure Protocols: The Bellare-Rogaway Three-Party Key Distribution Protocol Revisited

Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo; Colin Boyd; Yvonne Hitchcock; Greg Maitland

Paper 2004/345

On Session Identifiers in Provably Secure Protocols: The Bellare-Rogaway Three-Party Key Distribution Protocol Revisited

Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Colin Boyd, Yvonne Hitchcock, and Greg Maitland

Abstract

We examine the role of session identifiers (SIDs) in security proofs for key establishment protocols. After reviewing the practical importance of SIDs we use as a case study the three-party server-based key distribution (3PKD) protocol of Bellare and Rogaway, proven secure in 1995. We show incidentally that the partnership function used in the existing security proof is flawed. There seems to be no way to define a SID for the 3PKD protocol that will preserve the proof of security. A small change to the protocol allows a natural definition for a SID and we prove that the new protocol is secure using this SID to define partnering.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. This is the full version of the conference proceedings that appears in 4th Conference on Security in Communication Networks - SCN 2004, volume 3352/2005 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 352--367, Springer-Verlag.
Contact author(s): k choo @ qut edu au
History: 2004-12-11: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2004/345
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/345,
      author = {Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo and Colin Boyd and Yvonne Hitchcock and Greg Maitland},
      title = {On Session Identifiers in Provably Secure Protocols: The Bellare-Rogaway Three-Party Key Distribution Protocol Revisited},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/345},
      year = {2004},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/345}
}