### Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs and the Security of Triple Encryption

Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway

##### Abstract

The game-playing technique is a powerful tool for analyzing cryptographic constructions. We illustrate this by using games as the central tool for proving security of three-key triple-encryption, a long-standing open problem. Our result, which is in the ideal-cipher model, demonstrates that for DES parameters (56-bit keys and 64-bit plaintexts) an adversary's maximal advantage is small until it asks about $2^{78}$ queries. Beyond this application, we develop the foundations for game playing, formalizing a general framework for game-playing proofs and discussing techniques used within such proofs. To further exercise the game-playing framework we show how to use games to get simple proofs for the PRP/PRF Switching Lemma, the security of the basic CBC~MAC, and the chosen-plaintext-attack security of OAEP.

Note: An earlier version of this paper was entitled "The Game-Playing Technique." The current version is substantially different.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Cryptographic analysis techniques
Contact author(s)
mihir @ cs ucsd edu
History
2008-11-29: last of 16 revisions
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/331

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/331,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway},
title = {Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs and the Security of Triple Encryption},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2004/331},
year = {2004},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/331}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/331}
}

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