Paper 2004/281

Short Linkable Ring Signatures for E-Voting, E-Cash and Attestation

Patrick P. Tsang and Victor K. Wei

Abstract

A ring signature scheme can be viewed as a group signature scheme with no anonymity revocation and with simple group setup. A \emph{linkable} ring signature (LRS) scheme additionally allows anyone to determine if two ring signatures have been signed by the same group member. Recently, Dodis et al. \cite{DKNS04} gave a short (constant-sized) ring signature scheme. We extend it to the first short LRS scheme, and reduce its security to a new hardness assumption, the Link Decisional RSA (LD-RSA) Assumption. We also extend \cite{DKNS04}'s other schemes to a generic LRS scheme and a generic linkable group signature scheme. We discuss three applications of our schemes. Kiayias and Yung \cite{KY04} constructed the first e-voting scheme which simultaneously achieves efficient tallying, public verifiability, and write-in capability for a typical voter distribution under which only a small portion writes in. We construct an e-voting scheme based on our short LRS scheme which achieves the same even for all worst-case voter distribution. Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) \cite{BCC04} is essentially a ring signature scheme with certain linking properties that can be naturally implemented using LRS schemes. The construction of an offline anonymous e-cash scheme using LRS schemes is also discussed.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. An extended abstract of this paper was in ISPEC 2005.
Keywords
linkable ring signaturese-votinge-cashattestation
Contact author(s)
pktsang3 @ ie cuhk edu hk
History
2005-02-14: last of 5 revisions
2004-11-03: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/281
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/281,
      author = {Patrick P.  Tsang and Victor K.  Wei},
      title = {Short Linkable Ring Signatures for E-Voting, E-Cash and Attestation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2004/281},
      year = {2004},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/281}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/281}
}
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