A Note on An Encryption Scheme of Kurosawa and Desmedt

Rosario Gennaro and Victor Shoup

Abstract

Recently Kurosawa and Desmedt presented a new hybrid encryption scheme which is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack. Their scheme is a modification of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme. Its major advantage with respect to Cramer-Shoup is that it saves the computation of one exponentiation and produces shorter ciphertexts. However, the proof presented by Kurosawa and Desmedt relies on the use of information-theoretic key derivation and message authentication functions. In this note we present a different proof of security which shows that the Kurosawa-Desmedt scheme can be instantiated with any computationally secure key derivation and message authentication functions, thus extending the applicability of their paradigm, and improving its efficiency.

Available format(s)
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
public-key encryptionchosen ciphertext security
Contact author(s)
shoup @ cs nyu edu
History
2005-05-18: revised
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/194

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/194,
author = {Rosario Gennaro and Victor Shoup},
title = {A Note on An Encryption Scheme of Kurosawa and Desmedt},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2004/194},
year = {2004},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/194}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/194}
}

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