A Proof of Yao's Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation

Yehuda Lindell; Benny Pinkas

Paper 2004/175

A Proof of Yao's Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation

Yehuda Lindell and Benny Pinkas

Abstract

In the mid 1980's, Yao presented a constant-round protocol for securely computing any two-party functionality in the presence of semi-honest adversaries (FOCS 1986). In this paper, we provide a complete description of Yao's protocol, along with a rigorous proof of security. Despite the importance of Yao's protocol to the field of secure computation, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a proof of security has been published.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Foundations
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Appeared in the Journal of Cryptology, 22(2):161-188, 2009
Keywords: secure two-party computation Yao's protocol
Contact author(s): lindell @ us ibm com
History: 2011-01-11: last of 2 revisions; 2004-07-23: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2004/175
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/175,
      author = {Yehuda Lindell and Benny Pinkas},
      title = {A Proof of Yao's Protocol for Secure Two-Party Computation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/175},
      year = {2004},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/175}
}