Paper 2004/145

Electromagnetic Side Channels of an FPGA Implementation of AES

Vincent Carlier, Hervé Chabanne, Emmanuelle Dottax, and Hervé Pelletier

Abstract

We show how to attack an FPGA implementation of AES where all bytes are processed in parallel using differential electromagnetic analysis. We first focus on exploiting local side channels to isolate the behaviour of our targeted byte. Then, generalizing the Square attack, we describe a new way of retrieving information, mixing algebraic properties and physical observations.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
AESside-channel attacks
Contact author(s)
Emmanuelle Dottax @ sagem com
History
2004-06-30: revised
2004-06-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/145
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/145,
      author = {Vincent Carlier and Hervé Chabanne and Emmanuelle Dottax and Hervé Pelletier},
      title = {Electromagnetic Side Channels of an {FPGA} Implementation of {AES}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/145},
      year = {2004},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/145}
}
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